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Abstract
We combine post-displacement survey data with information from
a displacing rm's personnel les in order to reveal sources of worker
heterogeneity in search time and wage losses. First, we detail how
experience-related characteristics aect workers' labor market careers
during a period of three years after the bankruptcy of the rm. We nd
that wage losses are large. Interestingly, rm, rank, or job tenure do not
explain observed wage dierences. Idiosyncratic ability, job rotations
prior to displacement, and dierences in pre- and post-displacement job
characteristics contribute most to observed variations in wages. The in-
dividual post-displacement labor market histories allow for testing the
Blanchard-Diamond (Blanchard and Diamond 1994) ranking model for
which we nd no support. We then develop a dynamic reservation wage
updating model. The method of updating is based on the simple idea
that job seekers are informed about successful matches of their former
colleagues (Rees (1966); Granovetter (1974)). The model ts the data
well.
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Displacement wage losses have been used to examine the transferability of
human capital. Losses of rm specic skills are estimated as the returns to
tenure at the displacing rm. The tenure variable is used as a proxy for the
(specic) human capital that a worker has accumulated while working at that
rm (Becker (1962); Parsons (1972)). Addison and Portugal (1989) criticize
earlier specications of displacement wage losses which try to estimate loss
of specic human capital through pre-displacement tenure in the rm. They
show that the previous tenure is `productive' also in new jobs, implying a
partial transferability of human capital. Topel (1990) examines the losses as-
sociated with changing employment after displacement. He nds that more
senior workers suer from greater reductions in earnings compared to their
junior counterparts. This suggests that some human capital is built up during
the career which is (partly) destroyed upon displacement. Farber (1997) inter-
prets this as economic redundancy of skills. In a later paper Farber (1999) nds
that 30 percent of the return to tenure can be explained by heterogeneity while
the other 70 percent should be seen as returns to specic investments. Neal
(1995) examines the transferability of specic investments in human capital by
examining industry specic returns to tenure. He nds that some returns to
tenure are industry specic. Workers who continue their career after displace-
ment within the same industry face lower wage losses. Dustmann and Meghir
(2001) nd positive returns to experience and rm tenure for skilled, but not
for unskilled workers in Germany. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) also nd
1wage variation being explained by person-specic eects that vary across skill
groups in France.
In this study, we analyze the eects of displacement for workers from a sin-
gle large rm in the Netherlands. Because of the rm's bankruptcy, all workers
are ocially informed about their lay-o at the same date. The data we use
contains detailed information on the accumulated human capital in relation to
the occupation held and the career developed within the rm. Together with
the workers' hierarchical positions, their job characteristics, job rotations, and
promotions, we are able to thoroughly investigate the composition of wage
dierences before and after the demise of the rm. Moreover, using a post-
displacement survey, we can combine workers' pre-displacement occupational
and career characteristics with specic information on the search process and
the eventual new job characteristics.
We nd that wage losses are functions of characteristics of jobs before and
after displacement. Tenure with the rm, rank or job does not explain wage
losses. Signicant pre-displacement variables are the type of job, the number
of job rotations in the last rank, performance evaluation scores, as well as a
measure of idiosyncratic ability. Post-displacement co-variates explaining wage
losses are industry-specic characteristics, changes in responsibility on the job
and carried over job-related know-how.
The combination of detailed pre- and post-displacement information of job
characteristics, wages, and search history also allows us to develop and estimate
a simple model of dynamic updating of idiosyncratic reservation wages. The
updating is a product of learning from information about successful matches
2obtained from former colleagues with similar characteristics. The idea is based
on the observation that after the bankruptcy many former employees became
members of clubs where people met regularly (see also Rees (1966); Granovet-
ter (1974)). The updating model is strongly supported by the data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section two we describe the data,
including the development of the post-displacement survey. In Section three
we analyze variation in search time needed to nd the rst job. Pre- and post-
displacement earnings dierences are evaluated in Section four. In Section
ve, we propose a dynamic updating model to perform an integrated analysis
of search time and wage losses. Section six concludes.
2 The Displaced Worker Survey and Person-
nel Data
The displacement literature has long recognized the role of heterogeneity among
workers in understanding observed post-displacement search time and pre- and
post-displacement earnings dierences among workers. Compared to regular
lay-os displaced workers should be able to distinguish themselves as they
are not specically selected into unemployment but part of a rm that closed
down. This should, according to Gibbons and Katz (1991)), lead to better
labor market prospects compared to the average unemployed worker. The
analysis of losses from displacement presented in this paper primarily focuses
3on worker-specic heterogeneity.
In the U.S. wage losses of 10 to 30% for displaced workers are reported
(Ruhm (1991) and Kletzer (1998)). Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) use
(unemployment insurance) administrative data to show that displaced work-
ers do not only suer from wage losses upon displacement but also lag be-
hind in average wage growth several years before being displaced. For Europe
the following picture emerges from the currently available literature: Earn-
ings losses range from nothing at all (Abbring, van den Berg, Gautier, Gijs-
bert, van Lomwel, van Ours and Ruhm (2002), Bender, Dustmann, Margolis
and Meghir (2002)) to somewhat less than 10% (Albk, van Audenrode and
Browning (2002); Borland, Gregg, Knight and Wadsworth (2002); Burda and
Mertens (1998))2. Several explanations for these dierences have been oered.
An institutional one is that European countries oer generous social security
payments which allow displaced workers to search for new jobs using the social
security cushion. Compared to their American counterparts European workers
are less likely to be forced into accepting lower paid jobs. This increases the
observed search time and the probability of nding a better match. But the
administrative data used in the European studies does not contain information
suciently detailed to properly estimate the variation of displacement wage
losses across individuals, and how that variation depends on careers, job ro-
tations, rank tenure and other specications of the jobs held before as well as
2One recent exception is Couch (2001), who nds in the German GSOEP data that annual
earning (not wages) of displaced workers declined by 13.5 percent in the year following plant
closure.
4after displacement.
The year 1996 marked the end of a proud history of more than 75 years
of aircraft production by the Dutch company Fokker. Founded by one of the
pioneers of aviation and aircraft design, Anthony Fokker, the company rst
blossomed in the 1920s when it became the world leader in aircraft construc-
tion, producing in both the Netherlands and the United States. After the
destruction of the production facilities during the Second World War, Fokker
remained one of the smaller players in the world aircraft industry, producing
predominantly civilian mid-range airplanes of 50 to 100 seats. In March 1996 it
led for bankruptcy and 5644 workers lost their tenured jobs. The bankruptcy
trustees created a new company, called Fokker Aviation, which contained the
viable remains of the old rm. A total of 953 workers were simultaneously
red from the bankrupt rm and hired by Fokker Aviation. Another group
of 700 workers was oered a contract to continue working for the trustees to
nish building airplanes already sold to airline companies; 3991 workers were
permanently displaced (Table 1).3
We use data from two sources. Fokker's electronic personnel data system
provided information about workers'pre-displacement careers inside the rm.
In 1999 post-displacement information was gathered through a mail survey
among all workers who were laid o after the rm's bankruptcy. Current
addresses of the respondents were obtained from the bankruptcy trustees. In-
formation from the Fokker Pension Fund was used to check upon deceased
3The bankruptcy trustees sold Fokker Aviation to STORK in 1997. For a complete
description see Trustee report (Deterink, Kn uppe, Leuftink and Schimmelpenninck 1997).
5employees. The addresses of deceased former employees were omitted from
the address les used for the survey. The `Fokker Survey' collected data on
the labor market experience for the three years following the workers' displace-
ment. This survey data has been linked to the information from the personnel
les.
The Personnel Data
From Fokker's personnel les we obtained information on each employee's type
of job, compensation, and demographics. Demographic characteristics include
date of birth, gender, education, marital status, and the hiring date of each
employee. The average tenure at the time of bankruptcy was 15 years. The
rm's hierarchy distinguishes 8 dierent levels below top management. The
highest observable step, the eighth level, is just below the top management and
the Board of Directors. For reasons of possible identication, the two upper
levels (9 and 10) were left out of the data-set.
The hierarchical structure roughly reects the division of unskilled versus
skilled workers as well as the organization of supervision. Production workers
are located in levels 1 to 3. Managers, engineers, and aircraft designers belong
to levels 4 to 8.4 Every position is `allocated' to a job activity. These activi-
ties are Administration, Sales, Management, Human Resources, R&D as well
as Production Preparation, Production Planning, Support, Production and
4For a detailed description of the company's structure in 1987-1996 see Dohmen, Kriechel
and Pfann (2002)
6Quality Control. Job rotation is dened as the number of lateral job changes
within a given hierarchical level. The lateral job change is a movement across
job activities without changing the hierarchical position to a higher (or lower)
level job. In addition to the normal tenure variable, we observe tenure within
the hierarchy and tenure within a specic position (job). The latter two tenure
variables were measured in months rather than years for the last position held
before lay-o.
We have calculated the unemployment insurance benets paid to the worker,
as well as the duration for which they were eligible. These calculations were ac-
cording to the Dutch regulations: On the day of the bankruptcy every worker
faces a six week ring period in which they receive their salary5. Older workers
are entitled to a longer ring period. The original six weeks are extended by
one week per year of tenure while the worker was older than 45 years. The
maximum ring period after a bankruptcy is 19 weeks.
After the ring period workers receive unemployment insurance benets. The
unemployment insurance pays 70 percent of the former salary, with a maxi-
mum of 55000 Dutch guilders. This implies a replacement ratio of 0.7 for all
workers receiving less than 78752 Dutch guilders annually. Sixteen percent
of our sample received annual salaries above this amount leading to lower re-
placement ratios for those workers.
The length of the UI payments depends on the labor market experience of the
worker. A worker is entitled to UI payments if he has worked 4 out of the 5
5The salary payments after a bankruptcy are paid out by the Dutch social security oces.
They are guaranteed regardless of the expected bankruptcy outcome.
7years prior to becoming unemployed. Workers who worked for 4 years are en-
titled to 6 months of UI payments. After 5 years worked, this rises to a total of
9 months, and to a total of 12 months after 10 years worked. Beyond 10 years
of labor market experience a workers' entitlement increases by an additional
6 month for every additional 5 years he worked. The maximum entitlement is
60 months.
A Measure of Idiosyncratic Ability
Learning models (Farber and Gibbons (1996); Altonji and Pierret (2001)) sug-
gest that idiosyncratic worker ability is not readily observable and that the
residual of an unrestricted regression of wage equation is a martingale. In
time-series representations of wage equations that martingale is often found to
be of order I(1) (see for example Pfann and Palm (1993), for Dutch as well as
UK wage models). This implies that the model's rst-order Koyck transforma-
tion { the wage growth { is stationary and that the residual distribution of a
regression { corrected for selective separations (quits and lay-os) { measures
the distribution of idiosyncratic worker ability revealed to the employer but
not to the econometrician.
We compare the 1993-1996 residuals of an unrestricted regression of the
wage growth during the last three years at the rm as a proxy of the distri-
bution of idiosyncratic worker ability at the time of the mass lay-o. If this
measurement is indeed a good proxy for unobserved ability we expect it to be
negatively correlated with search time, uncorrelated with starting wages, and
8positively correlated with earnings three years after displacement.
Alternatively, however, positive residual wage growth of the nal years at the
rm could also result from increased `risk' premiums paid to some workers to
entice them to stay and ght the rm's demise. If such premiums are based on
unobserved rm-specic skills only, we should expect that the residual is un-
correlated with search time after displacement and negatively correlated with
the starting wage as well as with the wage earned after three years.
The `Fokker Survey'
The mail-survey consisted of 14 pages, covering the labor market history of
the three years after the displacement. A respondent needed approximately
30 minutes to complete the questionnaire, excluding additional time needed to
search for precise information. The questionnaire was sent out in April 1999
to all 5506 workers in the survey population (see Table 1). In total, 2279 ex-
Fokker workers returned completed questionnaires (response rate equals 41.4
percent6). In appendix 6 we report results of the non-response analysis. The
survey results are of high quality for a self-administered mail survey. We
could validate some of the given information by comparing the reported salary
earned with Fokker to the information available from the administrative les.
Many respondents were able to ll in the exact amount of gross monthly salary
which they earned three years prior to the survey. In a validation study for the
6Surveys in the Netherlands have low response rates compared to the rest of Europe.
Dutch Statistics report 50% and 60% response for the `Quality-of-Life' and the `Labor Force
Survey' respectively. Labor Force Surveys in other European countries have response rates
between 82 and 93% (cf. Geuzinge, van Rooijen and Bakker (2000)).
9PSID, Bound, Brown, Duncan and Rodgers (1994) also nd reported wages to
be rather accurate on average. The mean error of log earnings found in Bound
et al. (1994) is 0.007. This is of the same magnitude as the mean error of
0.006 in our study. The standard deviation of our sample is 0.34. This is only
slightly higher than the standard deviation of 0.32 reported by Bound et al.
(1994).
The survey asked for information on the rst and the current job. Respon-
dents reported the date at which they started to work in the new position, their
starting wage and hours worked. Information was also collected on the type of
rm. We categorize new employers as belonging to the aircraft industry, other
manufacturing industries, or non-manufacturing. The respondents were asked
to assess their responsibility in their new job compared to that before displace-
ment. On a ve point scale, the middle category reecting a similar level of
responsibility, they could indicate `more', and `much more' responsibility on
the one hand, or `less' and `much less' on the other hand. Furthermore, we
collected information on the prerequisites for the new job { as perceived by the
respondent {. Here the answer categories were: `both their work experience
and their technical knowledge obtained while working with Fokker was neces-
sary to obtain the new job', `only the work experience' or `only the technical
knowledge' was necessary, a category in which neither their experience nor
their technical knowledge was strictly necessary, and nally as last category,
neither work experience nor technical knowledge was necessary at all.
103 Post Displacement Search Time
In the survey a question asking for the labor market status of every month
until three years after displacement was included. This information allows us
to examine the time needed to nd new employment. In the analysis pre-
sented we focus on the time it takes to nd the rst job after displacement.
Following Meyer (1990) we included the remaining duration of unemployment
benets. Theoretically, the remaining duration of the unemployment bene-
ts should have an eect on the duration of unemployment: unemployment
benets are the `returns' during the search process. The higher they are the
longer one can sustain searching for a job while maintaining a high reservation
wage. Unemployment insurance covers some percentage of the former salary
(the replacement ratio). The duration of the payments depends in our data on
the employment history. Near the exhaustion point of the unemployment in-
surance payments, workers face the prospect of lower benets. Hence, workers
are more likely to accept any job oered. We include the remaining duration
of the unemployment benets for each worker in the form of splines. Note that
the duration of benets are pre-determined and known to the worker. In our
sample the average duration of the benets is 88 weeks.
Other explanatory variables are education, age, tenure, type of job activity
while working with Fokker, and the hierarchical level achieved before displace-
ment. A career can be identied by the hierarchical level achieved, but also
within a hierarchy by the amount of lateral movements { i.e. across depart-
ments. The latter reects job rotation intensity and can be interpreted as
11the workers' breadth of job experience. To capture this element we include
the number of lateral movements within the last hierarchy achieved. Workers
who do not nd any employment in the period of 36 months are right censored.
In the empirical analysis of the period of time it takes to nd the rst job,
all workers who were oered a contract from the bankruptcy trustees are left
out as they experience no initial unemployment spell. Additionally, we exclude
those employees who do not classify themselves in the survey as unemployed
because they have either started their own business7 (self-employment, 2.5% of
sample), are full-time involved in voluntary activities or other types of unpaid
work, receive disability pensions, or have retired since bankruptcy (together
2.2% of the sample).
Table 2 presents the estimation results of a proportional hazard Weibull
model with gamma correction for unobserved heterogeneity. The data replicate
the standard patterns found in the empirical literature. In summary we nd
{ but do not present the estimates in Table 2 { the following results. Search
time increases with age. Younger workers nd new jobs faster. High-tenure
worker also have longer search oeruids. With the exception of a shorter search
7Self-employment is one route out of unemployment. However, as the self-employment
decision and the self-employment income seems to dier signicantly from wage outcomes of
comparable employed individuals. In fact Hamilton (2000) concludes: \[...] self-employment
oers signicant nonpecuniary benets, such as `being your own boss.' Many entrepreneurs
have not only lower initial earnings than employees with the same observed characteristics
but also lower earnings growth Hamilton (2000, page 628). In the specic data-set we use
in our study the incidence rate into self-employment is way below the usual numbers. We
will thus disregard the small group of self-employed in this paper.
12time for graduates from technical universities educational levels seem to be
insignicant. The hierarchical position is found to explain some of the time
needed to nd the rst new job after displacement. Compared to the baseline
category of the lowest hierarchy all (higher) hierarchical levels show shorter
search periods, other things equal.
The remaining duration of unemployment benets (in weeks) turns out to
shorten the search time around the expiration time (Table 2). It does not have
a signicant eect for the splines of 4-8, or 8-12 weeks. The splines capturing
the eects of UI benets for periods longer than 12 weeks also indicate a shorter
search time for longer remaining benets. This last eect shows that not only
around the exhaustion point, but also during the time in which benets do not
(threaten to) run out, new jobs are accepted. In our sample with high tenure
workers and with a generous UI system many workers simply do not come near
the exhaustion point. The average UI entitlement in our sample is 88 weeks
which explains that many workers nd employment while the remaining UI
entitlement is still much longer than 12 weeks.
Search time is found to be inversely related to level of exit on the hierarchical
ladder. More pre-displacement job responsibility increases the probability of
nding new work after displacement. Workers higher in the hierarchy also
found new jobs faster. Job rotations do not show a signicant eect with
respect to the duration of subsequent unemployment.
In the previous Section 2 we argued that idiosyncratic ability is either nega-
tively correlated with search time (general unobserved ability) or uncorrelated
13with search time (rm-specic risk premiums). Table 2 reports insignicance
of the ability measure. This is evidence in favor of the idea that the rm in
demise pays increasing risk premiums to workers to entice them to stay.
4 Displacement Losses








i is the monthly wage earned at the new job by worker i and W F
i is the
last wage earned before displacement. The wage dierence can be explained
by observable characteristics Zi as follows.
Wi = Zi + u1i (2)
where  is a constant vector and u1i is the residual unexplained by Zi.
When post-displacement wages, W a
i , are not available or unobserved, Wi
cannot be computed. The literature suggest to use as an upper bound of
rm-specic human capital that can be lost upon transition from one rm
to another the Mincer/Becker U-shaped tenure prole instead. Our data can
replicate the standard tenure results. The tted model of log wages at the day
of displacement on tenure proles, holding constant for education, age, and
gender (^ Xi) yields (t-statistics are given in brackets):
14ln(W F
i ) = :02 Tenure   :28 Tenure
2=1000 + ^ Xi ; with R2 = :58
(5:05) ( 3:47)
We observe Wi only for workers who found a proper match. For those workers
the oered wage W a was above the reservation wage when the oer arrived.












i + u2i (4)
where 
i is a vector of characteristics determining the reservation wage of
worker i and u2i is a residual. We do not observe the reservation wage, but we
do observe whether or not the worker found work as well as the starting salary
W a
i at the new job. We also know W F




Then, the set of selection equations (3) and (4) can be written as the probabil-
ity of having found an acceptable match as a linear function of characteristics

i (Heckman 1979). To account for possible selection bias caused by non-
randomness in nding new work, we need to identify dierences between Zi
and 
i. 
i includes variables unobserved by the outside employers but known
by the worker and to the former employer. The identifying variables should
15aect the worker's reservation wage but not the outside wage oer W a
i . Two
variables are used. One variable records short spells of temporary inability to
work (WAO) while being employed at Fokker during the period 1987-1996. We
assume that asymmetric information on individual well-being lowers the reser-
vation wage but not the outside oer. The other variable included records the
last job performance evaluation score at Fokker in 1996. Performance scores,
unobserved by potential employers, are positively correlated with reservation
wages as they are associated with the quality of work and possibly with the
quality of search. But they are assumed to be unrelated to the distribution of
outside oers.
Displacement Losses: The First Job
Table 3 displays results from simultaneously estimating the earnings dierence
equation (2) and the selection equation (4). We included pre-displacement job
characteristics (panel a) as well as post-displacement job characteristics (panel
b). Both types of variables are important in explaining variation in observed
wage losses. In the Regression, we also controlled for the standard tenure
proles at the rm, rank, as well as at the job level. Once we have controlled
for old and new job specications, none of these experience proles contribute
to explaining observed wage losses.
The average wage loss predicted for the median worker in the sample is
found to be 11.9 percent. This number is much closer to the loss found in
the US based on individual workers' data, and much larger than the numbers
16reported for Europe based on administrative data. This may be due to the
fact that these workers are very high tenured, quite old, and also probably
worked for a high-wage rm. Given this, these results are probably not incon-
sistent with other European studies that look at a more representative set of
displacements (see Kuhn (2002)).
The (pre-displacement)job characteristics variables reveal large dierences
in estimated wage losses due to dierent types of work. Compared to an admin-
istrative worker { who lost 11.9 percent { , R&D workers lost 7.1 percent more,
production workers lost 6.3 percent more, while workers in production prepa-
ration faced a higher wage loss of 7.0 percent. Quality control workers lost 8.3
percent more. Workers in sales, planning, support, human resources and man-
agement did not encounter signicantly higher wage losses than administrative
workers. Hierarchical levels do not explain variation in wage losses.
The variable indicating the number of lateral movements between job activ-
ities on the same hierarchical levels turns out to lower wage losses signicantly.
This is an indication that job rotation within the same hierarchical level lowers
wage losses by 3.2 percent per `rotation'. This result is very interesting. It
suggests that not the level itself is important for nding a good match, but that
the obtained level of generality within each level cushions displacement losses.
This is most likely a result from the fact that workers who experienced more
job rotations in the displacing rm have more opportunities to nd similar
jobs in a larger variety of rms.
For the post-displacement jobs characteristics we nd that workers remain-
ing with the same industry suer less wage losses. Compared to workers leaving
17industrial jobs altogether, staying in the aircraft industry reduces wage losses
by 4.2 percent. Compared to workers switching to other types of industries it
can reduce wage losses by 2.2 percent. This corroborates results found for the
US (Neal 1995). Workers who take on jobs for which their technical knowl-
edge or their work experience was necessary see their wage losses diminish by
6 and 4 percent respectively. Note that job experience does not reect (a) the
time of the experience, nor (b) the specic rm where that experience was
gained. Having jobs with lower responsibility increases wage losses. Some-
what lower responsibility translates to 5 percent wage losses, while much lower
responsibility leads to 10 percent higher wage losses.
Idiosyncratic ability enters the wage loss equation signicantly negatively.
This is consistent with our prediction that Fokker had to pay a `risk' premium
to make workers stay during the period of demise.
Three Years Later: Testing the Ranking Model
Until now, we have only considered the characteristics of the rst job after
the bankruptcy. In order to examine eects of wage losses over time and of
the length of unemployment we re-estimate the wage loss regression, but now
using the wage that was earned three years after the bankruptcy, at the time
the survey was conducted.
The estimate of W = W S
i   W F
i (where W S
i is the wage at the time of
the survey) provides the opportunity to test Blanchard and Diamond's (1994)
hypothesis of the ranking eect. The ranking eect assumes that rms receiv-
18ing multiple acceptable applications hire the worker who has been unemployed
for the shortest period.
The reason is that short unemployment spells signal { according to this
theory { good, but unobservable, citizenship. Ranking and non-ranking models
show similar unemployment dynamics and equilibrium wage outcomes, but
dierent wage dynamics. The ranking model can be tested because in our
survey we explicitly asked the respondents for detailed information on their
employment history between the time of displacement and the time of the
survey.
We dene two additional variables in our model:
 the total amount of time unemployed between displacement and the date
of the survey.
 the number of dierent employers between displacement and current job
(0 = unemployed, 1 = current job is rst job, 2 = current job is second
job, etc.)
Both the ranking and the non-ranking model predict that the total time not
worked enters the wage dierence equation signicantly negative. In the rank-
ing model long unemployment duration signals below average skills. The rank-
ing model assumes that the longer the inactive spell the lower the probability
that a worker will be hired by another rm that can choose from multiple
applicants. The ranking model would also predict the second variable to en-
ter the wage dierence equation signicantly, whereas the non-ranking model
would not. According to Blanchard and Diamond, given the unemployment
19duration having multiple employers reduces a worker's possibility to acquire
a badge of good behavior. Thus multiple employers lower the matched wage.
The non-ranking model would not predict the eect of multiple employers on
wages to be that negative. Table 4 shows the eects of the two additional vari-
ables on wage losses after three years of displacement. The longer a worker
was unemployed the higher the observed wage losses. This is consistent with
the predictions of the ranking model as well as the non-ranking model. Every
month of unemployment adds 0.65 percentage point to the observed wage loss.
But having multiple employers is not harmful. Quite the contrary, having had
more employers reduces wage losses. This is a refutation of the ranking model.
Idiosyncratic ability turns out to be signicantly negative, and the eect
is much higher than that estimated for the rst job after employment. This is
not in line with the prediction that unobserved ability would have a negative
eect upon rst employment which is subsequently diminished over time as
the new employer learns about the ability of the new worker.
We rather nd support for the alternative prediction of the eect of `risk
premium' that Fokker paid to keep workers whom they needed to stay in the
period of demise. As other rms do not face distress they do not need to oer
such a risk premium.
5 Updating the Reservation Wage over Time
Table 5 shows the evolution of the nominal wages of observed matches after
the bankruptcy. It reects the downward sloping curve so often portrayed in
20the search literature, and suggested to result from the endogenous interaction
between search, duration of UI, adaptation of reservation wages, and hyper-
bolic discounting by the individual worker (Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002).
How the adaptation of the reservation wage over time actually takes place is
not well explained in the literature. Although often referred to as `learning'
and modelled as a stochastic process accordingly, it remains unclear how up-
dating of the reservation wage actually occurs. Many view the adaptation
process as random, some say it depends on individual wealth (Bloemen and
Stancanelli 2001). Randomness is often assumed to result from trial and error.
In fact, for this to work a job-seeker needs the input of a large sequence of
job-interviews. But invitations for interviews are rare, and once invited for an
interview the rejection probability is remarkably low: 26.75 percent receive an
oer which is rejected, however most of those workers have received multiple
oers around the same time. If anything, the process should be one that is
based on { often unobserved { unsuccessful applications that determine the
reduction of reservation wages over time until a successful match is found.
We propose a dierent method of updating. It is based on the observation
that after the bankruptcy many former employees became members of clubs
where people meet regularly. Most of these clubs have a recreational purpose
{ we counted 14 dierent clubs, varying from a bowling club to a yoga club {
and two more general interest organizations that are responsible for the clubs'
activities. These are the Association of Former Fokker Employees, with 2,000
members, and the Community of Interests of Ex-Employees of Fokker, that had
1,100 members at the time we conducted our survey. Our assumption is simple.
21Rather than basing the consideration of when and by how much to adjust your
reservation wage on idiosyncratic experiences alone we suggest that people in
these clubs and organizations are informed about the successes and failures
of people similar to them and that that information is used for updating.
Although we do not have information on who was a member and how often
people met, we do observe for every worker in the sample the characteristics of
successful matches. The process of peer updating is modelled in the following
way.
Each updating process needs time. We call this a period, and we assume
that periods have similar lengths for all individual people. The risk set during
each period consists of all workers who are job-seekers at the beginning of the
period, Nt. A peer is dened as a worker with observable characteristics, Xit,
being similar to job-seeker i in period t. Mt > 0 workers nd jobs during
period t. Their matched wages and wage losses are observed by all other
workers, and the wages of recently matched colleagues may be standing in for
unobserved variations in local labor market conditions. At the beginning of
each consecutive period the risk set has been reduced to Nt+1 = Nt   Mt. In




);i 2 [1;N1] (5)
where Wi1 is the last wage earned before displacement, and  W i1 is the average
of all last wages earned by the other workers subject to displacement from the
same rm.
22In period t > 1, we order all job-seekers in the previous period t   1 ac-
cording to the observed successes in nding a job during that period, starting
with the successful ones. Dene ^ Wjt 1 as the observed matched wage in period
t   1 by the individual successful worker j, j 2 [1;Mt 1], and dene W 
it as
the expected wage at the beginning of period t that would have been obtained
by worker i; i 2 [Mt 1 + 1;Nt] if a successful match is believed { by the
job-seeker { to be independent of unobservable ability dierences between for-
tunate workers and unfortunate job-seekers with similar characteristics, that








, i 2 [Mt 1 + 1;Nt] , t > 1 , (6)
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
it = Pr(It 1 = 1jXit)  E[ ^ Wit 1jXit] (7)
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To calculate RWit we need to specify how to obtain estimates for Pr(It 1 =
1jXit) and for E[ ^ Wit 1jXit]. The rst component is estimated as a simple Pro-
bit model of observed successful matches ( It 1 = 1) and unsuccessful workers
( It 1 = 0) during period t   1 given Xit. The assumed randomness of suc-
cessful matches among peers allows us to compute the simple OLS regression
of observed matches on characteristics Xjt , and use the estimated coecients
to compute the predicted wage E[ ^ Wit 1jXit]. Finally, we assume linearity for









The parameters t will be estimated using a piecewise-constant hazard model
suggested by Lancaster (1990) including the correction for heterogeneity as
suggested by Murphy (1996). The likelihood function for this model is given
in Appendix B.
Table 6 gives the results of the estimation. The relative position of the
expected wages turn out to be highly signicant. All else equal they predict
longer search for higher expected wages. This conrms the idea that work-
ers learn over time and observe the matches of their coworkers rather than
trying to learn from their labor market failures alone. Based on matches of
their coworkers they extrapolate their chances of nding a job and the market
valuation of their skills. The rst row of Figure 1 gives the distribution of
the predicted chance that a worker will nd new employment based on the
observed matches of the previous period of his former colleagues. The second
row presents the distribution of expected (log) wages also based on observed
matches of former colleagues. The probability of employment times the ex-
pected wages { the third row { is the distribution of expected reservation wages.
Note that the distribution is widely dispersed in the second time period, while
it gets more concentrated in the later time periods. The estimated coecients
for the last two periods (time period four and ve) are statistically insignicant.
24Idiosyncratic ability is signicantly negatively correlated with the rst wage
after displacement (Table 3), signicantly negatively correlated with earnings
three years later (Table 4), and positively but insignicantly correlated with
search time (Table 6). From this we conclude that the residual of the wage
growth equation does not reect unobserved ability, but rather reects in-
creased `risk' premiums paid by Fokker during the period of demise to prevent
workers from leaving the rm.
6 Conclusion
We combined survey data from displaced workers and their personnel records
from a bankrupt rm to investigate post-displacement dierences in search
time and earnings. We nd that wage losses in the Netherlands are large and
comparable to those found in the US. Since the workers in our data set are
high tenured, relatively old, and probably worked for a high-wage rm, these
results may not be inconsistent with other existing European studies that look
at more representative sets of displacement.
Pre-displacement job-characteristics are found to be important predictors
of both search time and earnings losses after displacement. Search time in-
creases with age and tenure, whereas workers with a higher hierarchical posi-
tion search signicantly shorter than lower level workers. Although, the search-
time seems to be largely unaected by the specication of the job activity, it
plays an important role in explaining displacement wage losses after displace-
ment. The hierarchical level is inversely related to wage losses if employment
25is found within a year, while it has no eect afterwards. Pre-displacement
lateral job movements reduce earnings losses by 3.2 percent per job rotation.
The wage-losses of all workers together were estimated amount to 11.9 percent.
Staying within the same industry decreased the initial wage losses, but were
insignicant after three years.
We analyzed the displacement eects of tenure with the rm, within ranks,
and jobs. None of these tenure variables are found to contribute to explain-
ing observed wage losses. Other information on characteristics of old an new
jobs and how they dier nihilated the role of the variables traditionally sug-
gested to represent rm-specic and not transferable on-the-job investments
in productive human capital. This is surprising and possibly an important
result. More research is needed that uses similar detailed information on pre-
and post-displacement job-characteristics before we can draw further reach-
ing conclusions. But for our data-set the explanation of rm-specic human
capital to understand observed wage losses is not supported.
Our data refutes the Blanchard-Diamond (1994) ranking model. After a
period of three years, workers who had multiple employers have lower wage
losses.
Idiosyncratic ability, measured as the residual wage growth during the last
three years at the displacing rm, turned out to be an important and insight-
ful variable. Not because unobserved ability was found to be important to
explain variation in post-displacement search time and wage losses, but be-
cause it revealed that the distressed rm had a wage policy of paying `risk'
premiums during its nal years of existence to entice workers not to abandon
26the distressed rm.
Allowing workers to learn from the labor market experience of their for-
mer co-workers and basing their search strategy on matching results observed
of workers similar to them is found to be an important explanation of the
simultaneous dynamics of reservation wages and observed unemployment du-
rations. Similar workers who found high wage jobs increase the unemployed
peer worker's reservation wage as well as the predicted search time. Workers
from higher hierarchical positions nd a new job faster than their lower ranked
counterparts.
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32Tables
Table 1: Composition of Fokker Workforce and Survey Population at the Time of
the Bankruptcy
N %
Displaced Workers 3991 70.71
Bankruptcy trustees 700 12.40
Fokker Aviation B.V. 953 16.89
Total 5644 100.00
Pilot 100 .
Other Workers involved in the 38 .
development of the Survey
Survey Population 5506 .
33Table 2: Survival Analysis: Timing of First Employment after Displacement
Weibull Proportional Hazard
Coe. s.d. z p
Weeks of UI remaining: (0,4) 0.586 0.095 6.17 0.000
Weeks of UI remaining: [4,8) -0.307 0.160 -1.93 0.054
Weeks of UI remaining: [8,12) 0.089 0.130 0.69 0.490
Weeks of UI remaining: [12,26) 0.104 0.019 5.52 0.000
Weeks of UI remaining: [26,1] 0.017 0.001 12.62 0.000
Firm Tenure -0.064 0.019 -3.41 0.001
Firm Tenure2 /1000 0.833 0.480 1.73 0.083
Hierarchy Tenure -0.001 0.001 -0.53 0.596
Hierarchy Tenure2 /1000 0.001 0.002 0.33 0.745
Job Tenure 0.000 0.001 0.31 0.760
Job Tenure2 /1000 0.000 0.002 0.20 0.843
Number of Internal Trainings -0.007 0.009 -0.79 0.429
Number of External Trainings -0.003 0.026 -0.11 0.913
Job Activity: Sales -0.321 0.176 -1.83 0.068
Job Activity: R & D -0.333 0.157 -2.12 0.034
Job Activity: Production Preparation -0.245 0.159 -1.54 0.124
Job Activity: Production Planning -0.128 0.169 -0.76 0.449
Job Activity: Production -0.054 0.153 -0.35 0.724
Job Activity: Support 0.041 0.199 0.21 0.837
Job Activity: Human Resources -0.075 0.212 -0.35 0.724
Job Activity: Quality Control -0.100 0.183 -0.05 0.956
Job Activity: Management -0.433 0.191 -2.27 0.023
Hierarchical Level 2 0.186 0.111 1.68 0.093
Hierarchical Level 3 0.437 0.133 3.28 0.001
Hierarchical Level 4 0.317 0.139 2.28 0.022
Hierarchical Level 5 0.516 0.160 3.23 0.001
Hierarchical Level 6 0.717 0.179 4.01 0.000
Hierarchical Level 7 0.817 0.263 2.38 0.017
Hierarchical Level 8 0.741 0.263 3.11 0.002
Idiosyncratic Ability 0.458 0.282 1.63 0.104
WAO-% -0.006 0.003 -1.96 0.050
1=ln 0.604 0.033 18.59 0.000
1=ln -3.203 0.993 -3.22 0.001
Observations 1610
Notes: Weibull proportional hazard model with gamma frailty. The hazard is specied as
  t 1 exp(0 + X). Where  is assumed to follow a gamma distribution and  is the
coecient of the Weibull distribution. Failure event is the timing of rst employment past
the bankruptcy for all displaced workers. We control also for plant location and evaluation
scores, age and education. Further we include dummies for gender and for marital status.
Hierarchical levels 1 to 3 are blue collar production workers, 4-8 are white collar workers.
Level 8 corresponds to a hierarchical level below the top-management.Table 3: Estimates of Wage Losses
(a) Pre-Displacement Variables
Marg. Eect s.e. t p Mean
Firm Tenure -0.003 0.003 -1.07 0.287 15.286
Firm Tenure2 /1000 0.052 0.085 0.61 0.543 0.300
Hierarchy Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.72 0.472 335.086
Hierarchy Tenure2 /1000 -0.000 0.000 -1.03 0.304 136.805
Job Tenure -0.000 0.000 -0.15 0.877 230.559
Job Tenure2 /1000 0.000 0.000 0.40 0.689 77.705
Number of Internal Trainings -0.001 0.002 -0.84 0.400 2.232
Number of External Trainings -0.004 0.005 -0.74 0.458 0.579
Job Activity: Administration { Reference { 0.067
Job Activity: Sales -0.010 0.031 -0.32 0.749 0.070
Job Activity: R & D -0.071 0.030 -2.37 0.018 0.188
Job Activity: Production Preparation -0.070 0.030 -2.29 0.022 0.121
Job Activity: Production Planning -0.046 0.032 -1.44 0.151 0.068
Job Activity: Production -0.063 0.030 -2.12 0.034 0.269
Job Activity: Support -0.061 0.038 -1.61 0.108 0.038
Job Activity: Human Resources 0.000 0.038 0.01 0.991 0.031
Job Activity: Quality Control -0.083 0.035 -2.38 0.017 0.070
Job Activity: Management -0.004 0.030 -0.13 0.893 0.078
Hierarchical Level 1 { Reference { 0.469
Hierarchical Level 2 -0.005 0.022 -0.21 0.833 0.127
Hierarchical Level 3 0.025 0.026 0.96 0.336 0.113
Hierarchical Level 4 0.022 0.028 0.79 0.432 0.173
Hierarchical Level 5 0.054 0.032 1.71 0.088 0.111
Hierarchical Level 6 0.031 0.035 0.86 0.389 0.090
Hierarchical Level 7 -0.037 0.049 -0.76 0.445 0.022
Hierarchical Level 8 0.053 0.053 1.00 0.316 0.022
Number of lateral movements 0.032 0.012 2.76 0.006 0.236
Evaluation: Unsatisfactory -0.254 0.051 -4.94 0.000 0.000
Evaluation: Good { Reference { 0.660
Evaluation: Very Good 0.029 0.015 1.95 0.051 0.016
Evaluation: Excellent -0.001 0.003 -0.19 0.846 0.324
Idiosyncratic Ability -0.011 0.004 -2.55 0.011 0.084
WAO - % 0.001 0.000 4.90 0.000 2.581(b) Post-Displacement Variables
Marg. Eect s.e. t p Mean
New Job: Much more responsibility 0.011 0.018 0.60 0.548 0.123
New Job: More responsibility 0.016 0.014 1.14 0.253 0.240
New Job: Same responsibility { Reference { 0.313
New Job: Less responsibility -0.048 0.014 -3.31 0.001 0.210
New Job: Much less responsibility -0.101 0.018 -5.52 0.000 0.114
Not Industry { Reference { 0.571
Other Industry 0.020 0.012 1.61 0.107 0.269
Aircraft Industry 0.042 0.015 2.69 0.007 0.160
Technical knowledge and job experience necessary 0.027 0.017 1.64 0.100 0.208
Technical knowledge necessary 0.063 0.027 2.32 0.020 0.041
Job experience necessary 0.045 0.015 3.02 0.003 0.355
Technical knowledge & experience useful { Reference { 0.212
Neither experience nor technical knowledge -0.037 0.017 -2.18 0.029 0.184
^  0.018 0.135
Observations 1641
Predicted  log(W) -0.119
Note: Sample consists of all workers that were neither employed by the bankruptcy trustees
nor by Aviation. Age, education, plant location, gender, and marital status are held constant
in this regression.
36Table 4: Wage Losses Three Years after Displacement
Marg. Eect s.e. t p X
Months unemployed -0.007 0.001 -6.49 0.000 5.026
Number of employers: 0 -0.023 0.024 -0.96 0.336 0.179
Number of employers: 2 0.034 0.013 2.55 0.011 0.278
Number of employers: 3 0.043 0.019 2.26 0.024 0.092
Number of employers: 4 0.070 0.031 2.27 0.023 0.032
Number of employers: > 4 0.012 0.039 0.30 0.763 0.020
Idiosyncratic Ability -0.336 0.054 -6.25 0.000 0.000
Observations 1574
Predicted  log(W) -0.025
Note: We control also for age, rm, hierarchical and job tenure, as well as number of train-
ings, job activity, hierarchical level, lateral movements, new job responsibility, education,
required knowledge, gender and marital status.
37Table 5: Avg. Salary and number of Matches per 3 month period
Time tp 1 tp 2 tp 3 tp 4 time period 5
period < 6/96 < 9/96 < 12/96 < 3/97 < 6/97 < 9/97 < 12/97 < 3/98 < 6/98 < 9/98  9/98
matches 835 393 191 68 58 43 23 20 15 8 25
avg salaris 5845 5237 5177 4964 4896 4120 3780 4225 3637 3543 4353
at risk 1679 844 451 260 192 134 91 68 48 33 25
Notes: The rst three time periods refer to a three month period. I.e. < 6/96 refers to the period from March 1996 to June 1996.
The period geq 9/98 refers to the period September 1998 until the 1st of April 1999, when the survey was conducted.
3
8Table 6: Piece-wise Constant Hazard Model
Coe. s.d. z p
t1 -7.262 0.296 -24.53 0.000
t2 -7.532 0.299 -25.20 0.000
t3 -8.789 0.326 -26.97 0.000
t4 -6.363 0.293 -21.68 0.000
t5 -5.700 0.279 -20.40 0.000
t1 * relative wage position 0.113 0.107 1.05 0.293
t2 * relative wage position 1.451 0.340 4.27 0.000
t3 * relative wage position 6.804 0.591 11.50 0.000
t4 * relative wage position -0.776 1.025 -0.76 0.449
t5 * relative wage position 0.301 0.918 0.33 0.743
Idiosyncratic Ability 0.484 0.280 1.73 0.084
1=ln -13.881 185.741 -0.07 0.940
Subjects 1613
Note: t1 to t5 represent the time specic intercepts. We also control for all other variables
that are used in the rst duration estimation.
39Figure 1: Development of Job Expectations, Predicted Wages and Wage Expectations
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Fokker Survey Non-Response Analysis
We addressed the non-response issue as to make sure that the results of the
survey are reliable, veriable, and representative of displaced workers. Two
methods are used: Firstly, we conducted a non-response follow up among 200
randomly selected non-respondents using a core question approach. Secondly,
we used weighted as well as unweighted estimations using information of non-
respondents from the personnel les. The idea of asking a limited number
of core questions for a follow up, was rst suggested by Bethlehem and Ker-
sten (1986) as a method to distinguish between the group of non-respondents
who are simply unwilling to provide the detailed answers asked for in general
or specic surveys, and those unwilling to participate for reasons related to
the survey specically. To learn about possible non-random selection a limited
number of core questions were asked to non-respondents by means of telephone
interviews. Given the information we already had about the respondents and
non-respondents from the personnel les, the core questions should be su-
cient for identifying non-response bias. In Table A.1 the results are given from
the non-response follow up. We nd that the labor market status is compa-
rable between the respondents and the non-respondents. We conclude that
the non-response is randomly distributed with respect to the (un)employment
status.
The second test examines the eects of known variables of both respondents
41and non-respondents on the probability of response. To identify the composi-
tional dierences between respondents and non-respondents we used a simple
Probit including all variables from the personnel les to examine the dier-
ences between the respondents and the non-respondents. Having predicted a
probability of survey response allowed us to post-stratify the sample outcomes
with the inverse of the individual's response probability.
From the core question approach we concluded that the group of non-respondents
seems to match the group of respondents with respect to the labor market sta-
tus. The additional examination of non-response behavior showed that some
variables8 signicantly predicted non-response. This implies that non-response
was not random. As the weighted estimation dier very little from the un-
weighted ones, we report the unweighted results only.
8Variables that turned out signicant were: tenure of 25-29 years and more than 30 years,
married, female and salary scales 9-11 turned out to lower non-response, whereas age group
55+, low evaluation score, as well as jobs in R&D, production planning and being selected
for Fokker Aviation increased non-response.
42Table A.1: Employment status in 1999 { Response vs. Non-response
Core Question Approach








The econometric specication of the reservation
wage updating model
Following Lancaster (1990) we divide the observation period into M intervals,
let c1;c2;:::;cM 1 denote the border of the interval. The hazard of a person i
for interval m can then be written as
i(t) = ie
m, cm 1  t < cm, m = 1;2;:::;M (10)





1 if cm 1  t < cm;
0 otherwise
This indicator identies the interval into which t falls. Let us further dene
Dm(t) =
Qm
j=1[1   dj(t)]; m = 1;2;:::;M   1; D0(t) = 1. The variable simply
indicates whether t falls at or after cm.
Given possible heterogeneity due to some unobserved characteristics in the
true X, we follow Lancaster and Nickell (1980) and Murphy (1996) in as-
suming that the heterogeneity can be captured in the single random variable
 with a distribution of function H() and density h(). This is assumed
44multiplicative in the hazard which thus becomes:
i(X

i ;t) = i  e
m (11)
The hazard rate of person i for all M periods then becomes:
i(X
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m[(ti   cm 1)dim + (cm   cm 1)Dim]g

The likelihood contribution of person i who is leaving unemployment or cen-
sored at ti is









With  being an indicator variable that takes on the value one if the observation
is not censored and zero otherwise. In order to write the log-likelihood more
compactly, we dene
Tim = [(ti   cm 1)dim + (cm   cm 1)Dim]

















i  Tim (15)
46